Asset Pricing, Lucas Trees, and Options

Undergraduate Computational Macro

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Overview

Motivation

- We have used asset pricing examples as practice in dynamic programming and EPDVs, but have not explored the economics of these models
- In the **Permanent Income Model** lectures we analyzed the role of intertemporal smoothing and risk-aversion in helping consumers smooth consumption.
- Here, rather than considering an exogenous interest rate we will consider where asset prices should come from in a general equilibrium model
 - → We will follow a variation of Lucas (1978) and build connections to Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Hansen and Richard (1987)

Materials

- Adapted from QuantEcon lectures coauthored with John Stachurski and Thomas J. Sargent
 - → Asset Pricing I: Finite State Models
 - → Asset Pricing II: The Lucas Asset Pricing Model
- 1 using LinearAlgebra, Statistics
- 2 using Distributions, LaTeXStrings, QuantEcon
- 3 using Plots.PlotMeasures, NLsolve, Roots, Random, Plots
- 4 default(;legendfontsize=16, linewidth=2, tickfontsize=12,
- 5 bottom_margin=15mm)

Review of Preferences

Period Utility

- Notation warning: will occasionally use derivatives, such as the utility u'(c) we mean derivative, but in other cases we will use write the problem recursively and reserve c' for the next period notation
 - → Confusing at first, but you will see it used often in macroeconomics
- Consider utility which is strictly concave where:
 - $\rightarrow u'(c) > 0$: More is better
 - $_{
 ightarrow} \, u''(c) \leq 0$: (Weakly) Diminishing Marginal Utility
- Examples include

$$_{
ightarrow} \ u(c) = \log(c)$$
 and $u(c) = rac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ for $\gamma > 0$

 $_{
ightarrow}$ If u''(c)=0 then we have a linear utility function, $u(c)\propto c$ and u'(c) is constant

Strictly Concave Utility



- Positive Marginal Utility of Consumption
- Diminishing Returns
- No (visible, at least) point of satiation

Marginal Utility



- u'(c)>0 but decreasing u''(c)<0
- $\bullet \ u'(c_1)=u'(c_2) \implies c_1=c_2$
- If $u'(c_t) < u'(c_{t+1})$ then $c_t > c_{t+1}$
- The less they consume, the more valuable additional consumption in that period would be

Uncertainty

- What if the agent does not know $\{c_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ because it is random or uncertain?
- In that case, we can instead have the agent compare expected utility streams

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^\infty eta^j u(c_{t+j})
ight]$$

- \to Where $\mathbb{E}_t[\cdot] \equiv \mathbb{E}[\cdot|I_t]$ with I_t the information set we make available at time t for forecasting in our model
- → This uses our model of expectation formation from the **previous lecture**

Risk Aversion vs. Inter-temporal Substitution

- If u(c) is strictly concave the agent:
 - → **Risk Averse:** Prefers more deterministic consumption to those with a higher variance
 - → **Preferences for Consumption Smoothing:** Will substitute between time periods rather than smoother consumption over time rather than large fluctuations
- One challenge in macroeconomics with these preferences is that the u(c) serves both purposes, which have different economic interpretations.
 - → To disentangle, can use recursive preferences such as **Epstein-Zin** which decouple these two concepts

Smoothing Incentives

- Consider a simpler case where they live for two periods and don't discount the future: $V(c_1,c_2)\equiv u(c_1)+u(c_2)$
- Consider two possible bundles: $\{c_t,c_{t+1}\}$ and $\{ar{c},ar{c}\}$ where $c_t+c_{t+1}=2ar{c}$
- If the agent is risk-neutral, we see that $V(c_t,c_{t+1})=V(ar{c},ar{c})$
- However, if the agent if risk-averse, then

$$V(c_t,c_{t+1}) < V(ar{c},ar{c}) \quad ext{unless } c_t = c_{t+1} = ar{c} \; .$$

- → They strictly prefer smoother consumption over time
- \rightarrow i.e., would forgo consumption on average to gain smoother consumption

Smoothing and Concavity



- Recall $ar{c} \equiv (c_t + c_{t+1})/2$
- 2 periods, eta=1
- Same "price" for c_t and c_{t+1}
- Two possible bundles:
 - 1. $\{c_t, c_{t+1}\}$ 2. $\{ar{c}, ar{c}\}$
- Later, $\pmb{\beta}$ and prices will simply distort this exact tradeoff

Risk-Aversion Intuition

- Consider a utility u(c) and a lottery which is a random variable
 - ${}_{\rightarrow} \ C = egin{cases} c_L & ext{with probability } rac{1}{2} \ c_H & ext{with probability } rac{1}{2} \end{cases}$
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ Let $(c_L+c_H)/2=ar{c}$
 - \rightarrow We can form expected utility as $\mathbb{E}[u(C)] = \frac{1}{2}u(c_L) + \frac{1}{2}u(c_H)$
- Note if risk-neutral then $\mathbb{E}[C] = rac{1}{2}c_L + rac{1}{2}c_H = ar{c} = u(ar{c})$
- Then if an agent is risk-averse,

$u(\mathbb{E}(C)) > \mathbb{E}[u(C)]$

 \rightarrow i.e., would forgo consumption on average to avoid the risk

Risk Aversion and Concavity



- Interpretation as fair, risk-neutral prices for lotteries
- Then compare choice between lotteries:

1. $\mathbb{E}[u(C)] \equiv rac{1}{2}u(c_L) + rac{1}{2}u(c_2)$ 2. $u(\mathbb{E}(C)) = u(rac{1}{2}c_L + rac{1}{2}c_H)$

• The strict concavity of u(c) shows you are better off with the deterministic consumption

Consumption Based Asset Pricing

Why Study This Problem?

- Macro-finance and financial economics ≠ pure finance. Different goals and questions, though sometimes common tools
- If you are interested in macro-finance, then this is the core theory of aggregate asset prices ("consumption-based asset pricing")
- Even if you do not care about macro-finance or financial economics, macroeconomists need to understand asset prices because they are tightly connected to models of saving and investment
- Finally, if you have a model of asset pricing you can use it to invert consumer expectations of the economy from empirical asset prices
 - → e.g., the yield cure (i.e., prices bonds of different maturity) can be used to infer the market's expectations of future GDP growth

General Equilibrium for Asset Markets

- General Equilibrium (GE) refers to a model where all markets clear simultaneously. Supply equals demand, which determines the price
- The simplest models of asset pricing should have prices such as that of bonds, equities, insurance contracts, etc. determined by the same forces
- Agents might want to purchase assets in order to
 - → Delivery in the future where they expect to want more consumption relative to today (i.e. $u'(c_{t+j}) > u'(c_t)$ after discounting by β^j , etc.)
 - → Delivery in states of the world to hedge against bad outcomes. For example, if they think there is a 50% chance of a bad outcome, they might want to purchase an asset that pays off in that state to smooth consumption even if it may decrease their average consumption today

Exchange Economies

- The simplest models to understand asset prices are when the "endowments" are exogenous (i.e., the amount of goods each agent cannot be changed by their behavior)
- Then, there may be gains from trade if different agents get their endowments in different states of the world or at different times.
 - \rightarrow e.g., the young may have more endowments relative to the retired
 - \rightarrow e.g., employed have endowments at different times than unemployed
- If agents are able to trade these exogenous endowments we call it a "pure exchange economy"

Representative Consumers

- Since we will be looking at prices emerging from supply and demand, it is important to be clear when agents are competitive vs. can exert market power
- We will assume that no individuals have large enough endowments relative to each other that they can unilaterally affect prices of traded assets
- It turns out that if we assume agents have identical preferences and there are complete markets for smoothing consumption, we can solve the model with a single
 representative agent to get the same (aggregate) results
 - → The "endowments" of the representative agent are the sum of the endowments of all agents, i.e. the aggregate endowments
 - → Using a representative agent is an **aggregation result** given particular assumptions on primitives, not an assumption itself

Supply of Goods

- In the simplest version, think of there being a "tree" which produces a random stream of fruit each period.
 - → We are using "fruit" instead of dollars because it is important to consider that this is a physical good, not just a nominal value
- The random sequence of consumption goods (fruit) is $\{d_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$
- Let the process determining the fruit be Markov, where for some w_{t+1} iid

 $d_{t+1} = h(d_t, w_{t+1})$

- $_{
 ightarrow}$ Since Markov, could also write d'=h(d,w) for IID w
- Assume the "fruit" is **not storable**

Preferences

• At time **t** the consumer has preferences

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^\infty eta^j u(c_{t+j})
ight]$$

→ For now, assume that $u(\cdot)$ is strictly concave, but we will consider cases where it is not in the limit (e.g., $\lim_{\gamma \to 0} \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} = c$)

• We will solve a competitive equilibrium were the consumer buys and sells claims to the fruit of the tree (i.e., assets) to smooth consumption

Prices and Claims

- Let p_t = price of a claim to the fruit of the tree at time t giving the right to
 - \rightarrow Claim a unit share of the fruit that falls at time t
 - ightarrow Sell that claim in time t or t+1, where the (equilibrium) price will be forecast at p_{t+1} given time t information
- If d_t is varying this is "equity" rather than a bond, because there is no guarantee of how many pieces of fruit will fall at that time
- Let the state variable of the firm be π_t which is the number of claims to the fruit of the tree they own at time t

Budget Constraint

- Normalize the price of fruit to 1 at each time period, so p_t is in real terms
 - \rightarrow Think of this as spot markets for the fruit which we use as a price level
- The consumer has π_t claims to the tree, which delivers $\pi_t d_t$ pieces of fruit
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ They can sell the fruit for $\pi_t d_t imes 1$
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ They can sell the claim itself for $p_t \pi_t$
- They may want to:
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ Purchase $(c_t \pi_t d_t)$ additional fruit at price 1
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ Change the number of future claims by purchasing (or selling) $(\pi_{t+1}-\pi_t)$ claims at price p_t
- Putting together, the budget constraint is: $c_t + p_t \pi_{t+1} = \pi_t (d_t + p_t)$

Consumers Problem

- The agent is a **price taker** at p_t (i.e., this is a competitive equilibrium)
- State: π_t and d_t (and information sets for d_{t+j} and p_{t+j} forecasts)
- Taking prices as given, the consumer solves

$$egin{aligned} &\max_{\{c_{t+j},\pi_{t+j+1}\}_{j=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^\infty eta^j u(c_{t+j})
ight] \ & ext{ s.t. } c_{t+j} + p_{t+j} \pi_{t+j+1} = \pi_{t+j} (d_{t+j} + p_{t+j}), ext{ for all } j \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- → The first order conditions for this problem will yield a demand function claims to the the fruit tree and the fruit itself
- If d_t is Markov, we can write this problem recursively as a Bellman equation

Dynamic Programming

• Let the Markov price be p(d), then the Bellman equation for the consumer is

$$egin{aligned} V(\pi,d) &= \max_{c,\pi'} ig[u(c) + eta \mathbb{E}[V(\pi',d')|d] ig] \ ext{ s.t. } c + \pi' p(d) &= \pi(d+p(d)) \end{aligned}$$

- \rightarrow They forecast d' and p(d') based on their information set
- Substituting the budget constraint into the Bellman equation

$$V(\pi,d) = \max_{\pi'} ig[u(\underbrace{\pi(d+p(d))-\pi'p(d)}_{c(\pi,\pi',d)}) + eta \mathbb{E}[V(\pi',d')|d] ig]$$

Euler Equation

• Take the $\partial_{\pi'}$ of the Bellman equation

$$0=-p(d)u'(\pi(d+p(d))-\pi'p(d))+eta\mathbb{E}[\partial_{\pi}V(\pi',d')|d]$$

- Next the **envelope theorem** tells us how the value function changes with respect to the state variable π

$$\partial_\pi V(\pi,d) = u'(c)(d+p(d))$$

• Use $c = \pi(d+p(d)) - \pi' p(d)$, and $d' = h(d,w)$ for $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$

$$p(d) = \mathbb{E}\left[eta rac{u'(c')}{u'(c)}(d'+p(d'))\Big|d
ight]$$

Consumption in Equilibrium

• This is the celebrated **consumption-based asset pricing equation**

- \rightarrow Includes properties specific to the asset (e.g., p(d) and d)
- \rightarrow Includes consumers' preferences and process for consumption. Collect into m(c,c') the **stochastic discount factor**(SDF)
- If the consumer's consumption is tightly connected to the fruit of this particular asset, then there may be a correlation between c and the d and hence between m(c,c') and d'+p(d')

Sequential Notation

- In that case, lets directly use the m_{t+1} has a stochastic process
- It could have any correlation with a particular d_{t+1} process
 - → In fact, maybe being negatively correlated is a good thing for smoothing risks?
- In that notation, the asset pricing equation is

$$p_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1} (d_{t+1} + p_{t+1})
ight]$$

- \rightarrow However, this is just notation and we can switch for convenience
- Note that the first payoff of the "dividend" occurs at t+1. This is called **ex-dividend** pricing

Reminder: Permanent Income Model

- In the permanent income model, the consumer could purchase a 1-period riskless asset which paid ${f 1}$ with certainty.
 - \rightarrow Extending so the price of the risk-free asset might change as R_t
- The Euler Equation

$$u'(c_t) = eta R_t \, \mathbb{E}_t [u'(c_{t+1})]
onumber \ p_t^{RF} \equiv rac{1}{R_t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[eta rac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)}
ight]$$

 $_{
ightarrow}$ Converts gross interest rate R_t to a price on 1 period asset p_t^{RF}

Connecting to the Asset Pricing Formula

- Back to our current setup. Since the risk-free asset has no future claims, $p_{t+1}^{RF}=0$ and since it is risk-free the $d_{t+1}=1$

$$egin{aligned} p_t^{RF} &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1} (d_{t+1} + p_{t+1}^{RF})
ight] \ p_t^{RF} &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1} (1+0)
ight] \ &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[eta rac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)}
ight] = rac{1}{R_t} \end{aligned}$$

- ightarrow Previously: Given an R_t , find c_t, c_{t+1}
- \rightarrow Now: Given the c_t, c_{t+1} , could we find the R_t that would reconcile the asset pricing equation with consumer's optimality?

Aggregate Endowment and Complete Markets

Example: Claim to the Aggregate Endowment

- Consider if the tree is the full output of the economy
 - \rightarrow Interpretation: a claim to real GDP per capita
- In that case, the
 - \rightarrow demand is determined by the asset pricing equation
 - \rightarrow supply is inelastic (since it is an endowment)
- Market clearing requires that c=d for all states
- Substitute into the equation to get the price of a claim to the aggregate endowment (e.g., a perfectly diversified equity index)

Asset Pricing Equation

• We can now write down the equation determining the price of a claim to the aggregate endowment

$$p(d) = \mathbb{E}\left[eta rac{u'(d')}{u'(d)}(d'+p(d'))\Big|d
ight]$$

 \rightarrow Where the process d'=h(d,w) defines the conditional expectations

- This p(d) is now a recursive equation which we can solve for all d

Interpretation of the SDF for c=d

- The "fruit" process (e.g., GDP) effects asset prices through two channels
- First consider how d' > d affects m(d,d')
 - → Due to market clearing, more endowment tomorrow relative to today means that the ratio of marginal utilities will be higher
 - → Hence the asset prices will be need to rise to make the consumer indifferent between consuming today and tomorrow (after discounting)
 - → Higher asset prices deter borrowing, which ensures that markets can clear given the fixed endowment today
 - → Otherwise, the consumer would want to borrow against the future (i.e., Permament Income model)

Interpretation of the Dividend and Price Forecasts

• Next, the d' + p(d') term is more mechanical in

$$p(d) = \mathbb{E}igg[eta rac{u'(d')}{u'(d)}(d'+p(d'))\Big|digg]$$

- \rightarrow If d' is higher (in expectation) then the p(d) will be higher since it is a claim to the future endowment
- \rightarrow In addition, if there is an any persistence in d then a higher d today will lead to the probability of a higher d' tomorrow, which will also raise the price of the claim to the endowment
- Suggests crucial to understand how m^\prime and d^\prime are correlated

Assets under Complete Markets

- Consider a case with **complete market** where the consumer can purchase financial assets to help smooth consumption against all possible idiosyncratic and aggregate states of the world
 - → In particular, if there income/endowment fluctuates over time, they would trade with people who have the opposite fluctuations
 - \rightarrow If the income fluctuates idiosyncratically, trade with people in the opposite states
- Consider more broadly than just financial assets
 - → e.g., insurance contracts, implicit contracts with family, government social insurance, etc.
- Can't smooth fluctuations to **aggregate endowment** (e.g., GDP)

Complete Markets and Aggregate Endowment

- In a world with complete markets and identical preferences, you can show that all idiosyncratic preferences will be hedged against, and any individual asset cannot affect the aggregate.
- m(c,c') is the right way to discount for claims to the **aggregate endowment**, which can have its own stochastic process
- But more importantly, given the perfect diversification, the consumer should use that same $m(c,c^\prime)$ for all assets!
 - \rightarrow Otherwise, there would be arbitrage opportunities

Conditional Covariances

- For any random variables x_{t+1} and y_{t+1}
- The definition of the conditional covariance $\mathrm{cov}_t(x_{t+1},y_{t+1})$ is

$$\mathbb{E}_t(x_{t+1}y_{t+1})\equiv \mathrm{cov}_t(x_{t+1},y_{t+1})+\mathbb{E}_tx_{t+1}\mathbb{E}_ty_{t+1}$$

- The key to understanding the price of an asset with payoff process d_{t+1} will be its covariance with the SDF

Covariances and Asset Prices

• Apply this decomposition to the asset pricing equation

$$egin{aligned} p_t &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1} (d_{t+1} + p_{t+1})
ight] \ &= \mathbb{E}_t m_{t+1} \mathbb{E}_t (d_{t+1} + p_{t+1}) + \operatorname{cov}_t (m_{t+1}, d_{t+1} + p_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

- Recall: m_{t+1} measures value of consumption in different states
- For example, if consumption in a state is lower relative to today means $u'(c_{t+1})/u'(c_t)$ is higher and m_{t+1} is higher
 - \rightarrow Then, if d_{t+1} has a positive covariance with m_{t+1} , (i.e., it pays more in states where the SDF is higher) the price of the asset will be higher
 - \rightarrow Asset hedges against bad states

Risk-Free Asset and SDF

- Risk-free asset is a claim to one unit of consumption tomorrow with certainty
- The SDF m_{t+1} is a random variable which says how much you value payoff tomorrow in various states of the world
- Given the complete markets in the economy we see that

$$rac{1}{R_t^{RF}} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[eta rac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)}
ight] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1}
ight]$$

- Powerful tool: given asset prices such as the interest rate, and a functional form of m_{t+t} you can infer the market expectations of c_{t+1}/c_t

Finite State Asset Pricing

Finite State Markov Processes

- Using our tools from above, lets consider that the m_t and d_t follow a finite state Markov process (i.e., a Markov Chain)
- The processes will have variance degrees of covariance
 - ightarrow The extreme example is if $d_t = c_t$ as in the previous example, then the m_t will be perfectly correlated with d_t
 - → A perfect hedge against GDP would be have a perfect negative correlation
- Let the underlying random variable which generates the random states of both m_t and d_t processes be X_t

Growth Rates of "Dividends"

• Given that the growth rates of payoffs (and its correlation to the SDF) will be essential, define the growth rate of the endowments (e.g. dividends) as

$$d_{t+1} = G_{t+1}d_t$$

- \rightarrow Assume for simplicity that the growth rates are themselves IID
- Since the underlying random variable is X_t we can write this as

$$G_{t+1} = G(X_{t+1})$$

• Similarly, the SDF is IID and may be correlated with G_t through X_t

$$m_{t+1}\equiv m(X_{t+1})$$

Finite States

- Consider if $X_t \in \{x_1, \ldots x_N\}$ a Markov Chain where

$$P_{ij}\equiv \mathbb{P}(X_{t+1}=x_j\,|\,X_t=x_i), \quad ext{ for } i=1,\ldots N, j=1,\ldots N$$

- Baseline growth factor: $G(x_i) = \exp(x_i)$, with $x_i > 0$ for all $i = 1, \ldots N$, and hence $\log G(x_i) = x_i$
- Baseline process for X_t : discretized AR(1) process using Tauchen's Method
 - \to e.g. $X_{t+1}=
 ho X_t+\sigma w_{t+1}$ where the mean of the stationary distribution is $X_\infty=0$ and hence $G(X_\infty)=1$. No growth on average
 - \rightarrow Correlation ρ helpful for interpretation

Price to Dividend Ratio

- Let the price to dividend ratio be $v_t\equiv p_t/d_t$
- Divide the pricing equation by d_t

$$p_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1} (d_{t+1} + p_{t+1})
ight]
onumber \ rac{p_t}{d_t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1} rac{d_{t+1}}{d_t} igg(1 + rac{p_{t+1}}{d_{t+1}} igg)
ight]
onumber \ v_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1} G_{t+1} (1 + v_{t+1})
ight]
onumber \ v(X_t) = \mathbb{E} \left[m(X_{t+1}) G(X_{t+1}) (1 + v(X_{t+1})) igg| X_t
ight]$$

- This lets us describe the price-to-dividend ratio which is scaleless. Similarly, as m_{t+1} is typically a ratio of marginal utilities, it is also scaleless

Price to Dividend Ratio with Markov Chain

- Price to dividend called Price to Earnings (P/E) ratio in equity markets
- Continuing with this example, given the Markov Chain

$$egin{aligned} v(X_t) &= \mathbb{E}\left[m(X_{t+1})G(X_{t+1})(1+v(X_{t+1}))ig|X_t
ight] \ v_i &= \sum_{j=1}^N m(X_j)G(x_j)(1+v_j)P_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

- $_{
 ightarrow}$ We can stack these equations for all $i=1,\ldots N$ into a vector v
- \rightarrow Then solve for the v vector which is a linear equation for any $G(\cdot)$ and $m(\cdot)$

Risk Neutral Examples

Risk-Neutral Asset Pricing

- If risk-neutral, then $m_{t+1}=eta$ for all X_t
- Given the finite number of states, we can find a vector $v_t = v(X_t)$
- Define the matrix K where $K_{ij}\equiv G(x_j)P_{ij}$ and

$$egin{aligned} &v_i=eta\sum_{j=1}^N K_{ij}(1+v_j) & ext{for } i=1,\dots N\ &v=eta K(\mathbbm{1}+v)\ &v=(I-eta K)^{-1}eta K\mathbbm{1} \end{aligned}$$

 $_{
ightarrow}$ Assuming the $\max\{| ext{ eigenvalue of } A|\} < 1/eta$ as in LSS examples

Risk-Neutral Simulation

```
1 n = 25
2 mc = tauchen(n, 0.96, 0.02)
3 sim_length = 80
4 X_0_ind = 12
5 X_t = simulate(mc, sim_length; init = X_0_ind)
6 G_t = exp.(X_t)
7 d_0 = 1
8 d_t = d_0 * cumprod(G_t)
9
10 series = [X_t G_t d_t log.(d_t)]
11 labels = [L"X_t" L"G_t" L"\log(d_t)"]
12 plot(series; layout = 4, labels)
```

Risk-Neutral Simulation



0.2

Price-Dividend Ratios for Risk-Neutral Assets



Interpretation

- Remember that $m_{t+1} = eta$, so this is not driven by the SDF or the correlation between the SDF and the dividend process
- Why does the price-dividend ratio increase with the state?
 - → The Markov process is positively correlated, so high current states suggest high future states
 - \rightarrow Moreover, dividend growth is increasing in the state, which is persistent
- Hence, high future dividend growth leads to a high price-dividend ratio

Risk Averse Examples

Pricing with CRRA and Lucas Tree SDF

- Utility: $u(c) = rac{c^{1-\gamma}-1}{1-\gamma} ext{ with } \gamma > 0$
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ Then $u'(c)=c^{-\gamma}$, nesting \log utility if $\gamma=1$
- With complete market, $d_t=c_t$ and the SDF is

$$m_{t+1} = eta rac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)} = eta igg(rac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} igg)^{-\gamma} = eta G_{t+1}^{-\gamma}$$

Price-Dividend Ratio for CRRA

• Substitute this into the formula for the price-to-dividend ratio

$$egin{aligned} v(X_t) &= eta \mathbb{E}_t \left[G(X_{t+1})^{-\gamma} G(X_{t+1}) (1 + v(X_{t+1}))
ight] \ v_i &= eta \sum_{j=1}^N G(x_j)^{1-\gamma} (1 + v_j) P_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

• Rearranging as a fixed point with $J_{ij}\equiv G(x_j)^{1-\gamma}P_{ij}$

$$egin{aligned} v &= eta J(\mathbbm{1}+v) \ v &= (I-eta J)^{-1}eta J\mathbbm{1} \end{aligned}$$

Implementation

```
function asset_pricing_model(; beta = 0.96, gamma = 2.0, G = exp,
 1
 2
                             mc = tauchen(25, 0.9, 0.02))
 3
       G_x = G.(mc.state_values)
       return (; beta, gamma, mc, G, G_x)
 4
 5
   end
   # price/dividend ratio of the Lucas tree
 6
   function tree_price(ap)
 7
       (; beta, mc, gamma, G) = ap
 8
       P = mc.p
 9
       y = mc.state_values'
10
       J = P . * G.(y) . ^ (1 - gamma)
11
       @assert maximum(abs, eigvals(J)) < 1 / beta # check stability</pre>
12
       v = (I - beta * J) \setminus sum(beta * J, dims = 2)
13
       return v
14
15 end
```

Price-Dividend for Various Risk-Aversion Parameters



Interpretation

- Keep in mind that this is with perfectly correlated m_{t+1} and d_{t+1}
- Notice that v is decreasing in each case, in contrast to the risk-neutral case
- This is because, with a positively correlated state process, higher states suggest higher future consumption growth.
- In the stochastic discount factor, higher growth decreases the discount factor, lowering the weight placed on future returns
- Special cases:
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ If $\gamma=1$ then the v is constant, as the forces exactly cancel
 - $_{
 ightarrow}$ If $\gamma=0$ then the v nests the risk-neutral case

A Risk-Free Consol

- A risk-free consol pay a constant amount, a fixed coupon each period forever
- Asset has
 - $ightarrow \ \zeta$ in period t+1 (i.e., $d_{t+1}=\zeta$)

ightarrow the right to sell the claim for p_{t+1} next period

$$egin{aligned} p_t &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[m_{t+1}(\zeta+p_{t+1})
ight] \ p_t &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[eta G_{t+1}^{-\gamma}(\zeta+p_{t+1})
ight] \ p_i &= eta \sum_{j=1}^N G(X_j)^{-\gamma}(\zeta+p_j) P_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

Linear System

• Letting $M_{ij}\equiv P_{ij}G(X_j)^{-\gamma}$ and rewriting in vector notation yields the solution

$$p = (I - eta M)^{-1}eta M \zeta \mathbb{1}$$

Implementation

```
1 function consol_price(ap, zeta)
 2
       (; beta, gamma, mc, G) = ap
 3
       P = mc.p
       y = mc.state_values'
 4
       M = P \cdot G \cdot (y) \cdot (-gamma)
 5
       @assert maximum(abs, eigvals(M)) < 1 / beta</pre>
 6
 7
       # Compute price
 8
       return (I - beta * M) \ sum(beta * zeta * M, dims = 2)
 9
10 end
```

Consol Price

```
1 ap = asset_pricing_model(; beta = 0.9)
2 zeta = 1.0
3 strike_price = 40.0
4
5 x = ap.mc.state_values
6 p = consol_price(ap, zeta)
7 plot(mc.state_values, p; xlabel = L"X_t",
8 label = L"p_t",
9 size = (600, 400))
```



Option Pricing

Pricing an Option to Purchase the Consol

- An option is a contract that gives the owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at a specified price
- Many problems in macro are isomorphic to option-pricing problems
 - \rightarrow e.g.firm entry/exit decisions
- Consider an option to purchase a consol at a price $p_{oldsymbol{S}}$
 - → This will never expire (infinite horizon, or "perpetual" option)
 - \rightarrow The "call" option gives the owner the right to buy the asset
 - ightarrow The price p_S is called the **strike price**
- Let the dynamics of the console be driven by the SDF m_{t+1} and the growth process G_{t+1}

Exercising an Option

- Let $w(X_t,p_S)$ be the value of the option given known X_t but *before* the owner has decided whether or not to exercise the option
 - ightarrow Discounts with the SDF $m(X_{t+1})$
- $p(X_t)$ remains the price of the consol itself
- Bellman equation is

 $w(X_t,p_S) = \max \left\{ \mathbb{E}_t \left[m(X_{t+1}) w(X_{t+1},p_S)
ight], \; p(X_t) - p_S
ight\}$

 \rightarrow Left term is value of waiting, right is exercising now.

Option Pricing with Finite State Markov Process

• Using our SDF process

$$w(x_i,p_S)=\max\left\{eta\sum_{j=1}^N P_{ij}G(X_j)^{-\gamma}w(x_j,p_S),\;p(x_i)-p_S
ight\}$$

• If we define $M_{ij}\equiv P_{ij}G(X_j)^{-\gamma}$ and stack prices then

$$w=\max\{eta Mw,\;p-p_S\mathbb{1}\}$$

Fixed Point

• To solve this problem, define an operator T mapping vector w into vector T(w) via

 $T(w) = \max\{eta M w, \ p - p_S \mathbb{1}\}$

- $_{
 ightarrow}$ To solve this, we can find the fixed point of T(w)=w
- \rightarrow Also a linear complementarity problem in this case

Implementation

```
1 # price of perpetual call on consol bond
   function call_option(ap, zeta, p_s)
 2
 3
        (; beta, gamma, mc, G) = ap
       P = mc.p
 4
       y = mc.state_values'
 5
       M = P \cdot G \cdot (y) \cdot (-gamma)
 6
       @assert maximum(abs, eigvals(M)) < 1 / beta</pre>
 7
       p = consol_price(ap, zeta)
 8
 9
10
       # Operator for fixed point, using consol prices
       T(w) = max.(beta * M * w, p .- p_s)
11
       sol = fixedpoint(T, zeros(length(y), 1))
12
       converged(sol) || error("Failed to converge in $(sol.iterations) iter")
13
       return sol.zero
14
15 end
```

Example

```
1 ap = asset_pricing_model(; beta = 0.9)
2 zeta = 1.0
3 strike_price = 40.0
4
5 x = ap.mc.state_values
6 p = consol_price(ap, zeta)
7 w = call_option(ap, zeta, strike_price)
8
9 plot(x, p; xlabel = L"X_t", size=(600, 400),
10 label = L"p(X_t)")
11 plot!(x, w; label = L"w(X_t, p_S)")
```

